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Approved for Release
July 2000





28 October 1970

SUBJECT:

Military

Contacts with Chilean

29 September 1970

Requests COS call in

"tó.

"work closely with Chief . . . in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might deny the presidency to Allende."

30 September 1970

Following three officers key figures in military planning:

- 1.
- 2. General VALENZUELA
- 3.

Requests Station make it clear to these officers individually that USG views military solution only answer; that they to be assured USG will provide support and pledges they demand.

SANTIAGO 5 October 1970

briefed on above by COS October. Objective to condition high-level military contacts to start working toward military solution with necessary assurances that they can proceed with full moral backing by USG and, within reason, can depend on our material support once they decide to move.

SANTIAGO 1970

met October with

suprised he chosen for approach, admitted contacts with Air Force, Navy and the stated had only small organization which could not move until they felt they could win.

SANTIAGO 1970

that General VIAUX had told October of his readiness to launch golpe evening 9 October. VIAUX asked for paralysing gas grenades which requested from

8 October 1970

SANTIAGO 9 October 1970

who claimed talked to VIAUX previous evening. VIAUX and people not ready to move and convinced he has no people.

The has told his principals that he sees no chance of anything happening which will deny Allende the presidence.

SANTIAGO 8 October 1970

called October by

said officers at school had been meeting for some time and had been working with unnamed high-ranking member of government to try to exert force on Frei to eliminate General Schneider peacefully or otherwise. Wanted to ask to see if could invite Schneider to Also asked if USG would help with several hundred small automatic weapons if needed.

SANTIAGO 14 October 1970

had long discussion October with and gave him party line similar to that previously given to VALENZUELA, and does not feel golpe is correct solution to problem and Army must wait and be prepared to take action only when Allende does something unconstitutional.


14 October 1970

Asks Station to deliver Eyes Only message from to Choose two general officers who can best be trusted and most likely respond, to convey to these officers that high authority in Washington has authorized you to offer material support short of armed intervention to Chilean armed forces in any endeavors they may undertake to prevent election of Allende on 24 October.



6 October 1970

Headquarters requests Station use whatever channel available dissuade VIAUX from precipitate coup but offer him full support for move at proper time.




SANTIAGO 7 October 1970

Re will attempt contact General Camilo VALENZUELA to brief and also ask him to caution VIAUX about precipitate move.

SECRET

pass following message to "If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and material that might be immediately required."



SANTIAGO 16 October 1970

COS has directed not to expand circle of senior officers to be made knowledgeable of USG position.

SANTIAGO 1970

between least to least to persuade SCHNEIDER to change his position re Army intervention turned out to be fiasco. The reminded least that USG stands ready to help with anything plotting elements may need.

SECULI

SANTIAGO 1970

summoned October by told told that since last meeting to the had established numerous unnamed contacts with military personnel and VIAUX people. Plan exists involving kidnapping of "various important people." Need arms and need money to procure same.

Station does not rule out possibility Tronting for VIAUX.

SANTIAGO 18 October 1970

by evening 18 October furnish eight to ten tear gas grenades. And that within 48 hours, they need three 45 caliber sub-machine guns with 500 rounds ammunition each.

Station plans give six tear gas grenades to for delivery to and and are and are and are and are and are are also and are are and are are also and are are also and are are also and are are are also and are are also are are also are are also are al

SANTIAGO 1970

brought together with and and 18 October. discreetly withdrew when pointedly stated "this Chilean matter."

SANTIAGO 19 0c tober 1970

where and waiting.
turned over two packages (tear gas and masks to ...).

returned General VALENZUELA called to say he would visit later that evening. VALENZUELA reminded of last talk and stated he now ready to act. On 19 October will invite SCHNEIDER to stag party and kidnap him and take him to Argentina. Named principals. Said VIAUX knowledgeable of operation but not personally involved.

SANTIAGO 20 20 October 1970

VALENZUELA visited 20 October

- VALENZUELA denied

in any way

involved in op.

SANTIAGO 20 20 20 October 1970

View increasing risks keeping involved, Station intends withdraw him from further participation by 24 October.

SANTIAGO 20 0c tober 1970

sent by to visit 20 October to explain why 19 October abduction attempt aborted. Said SCHNEIDER's car too fast and outran pursuers.

Confirmed in charge of operation.

Mentioned that would see were evening October to pick up certain items promised him (Station will deliver SMG's to all.)

SANTIAGO 22 October 1970

General SCHNEIDER machine gunned on way to work a.m. 22 October.

SANTIAGO 22 October 1970

-- SMG's delivered to by 1400 hours,

(APPARENTLY NEITHER VALENZUELA NOR CONTACT WITH AS OF 27 OCTOBER, NOR HAS MADE ANY OTHER CONTACTS ON BEHALF OF THE STATION.)



## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Station Feelers & Contacts with Viaux Group

6 OCTOBER

Participants:

that General Roberto VIAUX told him following on evening Oct: (a) Viaux ready to launch golpe evening 9 Oct or morning of 10 Oct; (b) Viaux urgently needed several hundred gas grenades (FO type that paralyzes.)

he had wired for gas grenades.


6 OCTOBER

Hqs advised the Station that the above represented a situation we feared most, a minicoup with scant chance of success. Requested Station use whatever channel available, including to persuade viaux to hold his action in abeyance while offering him full support for move at proper time.

6 OCTOBER

Station asked Hqs to repeat authorization to use to persuade Viaux to hold his action in abeyance and to offer him USG support for more serious move at proper time. Station convinced that any move by Viaux to be minicoup at best.

7 OCTOBER SAGO Station unaware what prompted to approach will see General Valenzuela on Oct and will take opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate move by Viaux. COS will also ask to dissuade Viaux without promising Viaux USG support for any later move.



9 OCTOBER SAGO Oct who said he talked with Viaux last night.
said Viaux unable to move at this time. Not ready. Has no forces.

9 OCTOBER SAGO had a long talk. In response to COS question whether provision arms for Viaux might be helpful, replied: to arm whom? convinced Viaux lacks sizeable following. Said Army with Air Force help could crush any Viaux attempt.



10 OCTOBER SAGO

- During early morning hours Oct came directly and unannounced to said they had reviewed earlier talk

SE ERET

and wanted to make clarifications regarding their position and needs; arms drop is needed for Santiago area and would be used by commando or shock units. Discussed how arms would be transported from DZ and arrangements at DZ to guide aircraft. Said Viaux also needs VHF commo gear and life and disability insurance for Army officers behind him. Asked for 5-blank policies up to \$50,000 US currency and 20 other policies up to \$25,000. Also stressed need for riot control and mob dispersal weapons. Said General-Schneider is principal stumbling block. Said Viaux will need extensive USG aid in form of food and medicine after coup. Also said no foreigners should be there when activities start and would have to bug promised to pass the proposed DZ and radio frequencies

10 OCTOBER

Station was given following guidance re Viaux: (a) Encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning; (b) Gain some influence over his actions: (c) To suspend any actual decision, insofar as we can influence him, to stage a coup until we can assess its chances for success. Questioned why arms drop is only way of establishing bona fides and why money would not work

Asked Station to try influence Viaux, find out what forces he controls and finance him as conditions warrant. Believe air drop ill-considered.

11 OCTOBER

VIAUX - Station advised it was not possible to pass Hqs instructions to prior his meeting with Viaux said drop had to be made no later than Oct.

made no commitment or counter offer, unaware of Hqs instructions. Viaux also asked for life and

physical disability policies immediately.

12 OCTOBER

/VIAUX/ departed Santiago
li Oct which was day of several meetings between and Viaux group

Important points of

meetings were Viaux dropped his ultimatum conditions, and said he needed more than any other thing "paralyzing gas" for riot control. Claimed he receiving some material help from

13 OCTOBER SAGO

Station requested firm guidance from Hqs on what objectives to pursue in further dealings with Viaux.

13 OCTOBER

Debriefing of at Hqs indicates Viaux be contacted soonest and informed:

(1) Sponsors regret technical factors preclude air drop and "paralyzing gas". (2) In lieu of above hardware, can promise financing if Viaux can police up what he needs himself. (3) Sponsors will pledge up to \$250,000 US, separate and distinct from sub-para 2 financing, for "insurance purposes". Message also provided guidance for further dealings with Viaux group.

SAGO SAGO

on morning 14 Oct. Expressed pleasure
that recontact was made and welcomed
told that Viaux group will meet night 14 Oct
to decide proper time to move on 17 Oct. First step is
to kidnap Generals Schneider Claimed that
Viaux commands 150 trained and armed men who will
serve as shock troops. Provided other details on Viaux
following. In return, said his sponsors pledged
\$250,000 in lieu of written insurance policies. Also said
Viaux group probably penetrated by PCCh and that
should be closely watched.
Sponsors could not furnish arms or paralyzing gas due
to time and technical factors.
Viaux

made strong plea for a minimum of 6 gas grenades which, he stated, were needed for Schneider/kidnap operation. Commented that mistaken if he believed had already supplied some arms Admitted Viaux in touch-w but that only assistance offered by were 6 22 Cal. pistols which insufficient for group's needs.

16 OCTOBER SAGO

with Viaux group. Oct meeting of Viaux group (See postponed because unnamed could not attend. Also: told that Viaux accepted insurance pledge in lieu of policies. Viaux

for . If provided,
would join Viaux. instructed tell
that not interested in money, only
in action and would join if coup seemed have good chance
for success.) asked for sponsor's opinion
of plan import five Puerto Ricans to kidnap Schneider
said such move dangerous,

. <del>16 OCTOBER</del>

HQS

policy and objectives reviewed at high level
USG 15 Oct. Firm and continuing policy Allende be
overthrown by coup. Group also determined that coup
attempt carried out by Viaux alone would fail and counterproductive to greater interests of Instructed
Station get message to Viaux repeating above and advising
him to preserve his assets for proper time at which
he will have our support. Also to advise Viaux to joinforces with other coup planners so they act in concert.

16 OCTOBER SAGO

Again Viaux group postponed making decision on if and when move. asked advice on practicality of minicoup in which 25-30 men would hit and run to and Viaux go into asylum. asked for to buy important unnamed general. In response to query as to General iden, said he would approach and if General agreed, would identify.

17 OCTOBER SAGO

in to No reaction since Viaux group met 16 Oct and decided to move 21 or 22 Oct.

gas grenades and masks. (After exchange of SAGO and and it decided give grenades and masks to group instead of Viaux).

19 OCTOBER SAGO

said coup now set for 22 Oct and that abduction of Gen. Schneider is first link in chain of events. Viaux to leave for Valparaiso so cannot be linked to coup.

NO FURTHER CONTACT BETWEEN /COS and VIAUX GROUP.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Scenario Passed to General Viaux

1. Background: On October 1970 informed his contact, that he could no longer continue to meet the General Viaux group without meeting some of their requests for support.

At the same time was given a typed scenario for him to memorize and then to use to cover his failure to produce an airdrop.

3. The Station-prepared scenario, as reconstructed from memory, follows: Tell General Viaux that we are understanding of his needs and support his intentions.

you have been unable to alrange

the airdrop because of technical and security problems.

4.



DENIED IN TOTO